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Abstract
We study the effect of Hindu-Muslim riots on election results in In-
dia. We combine data on geo-coded riots with data on state elections and
on demographics and public goods provision to construct a unique panel
data set for 16 large states in India from 1981-2001. A new instrument
is used that draws upon the random variation in the day of the week that
Hindu festivals fall on, as set by a lunar calendar. The probability of a
riot increases if a Hindu festival falls on a Friday, the holy day for Mus-
lims. This allows us to isolate the causal effect of riots on electoral results.
The results are also corrected for under-reporting of riots and their effect
on nearby districts. We find that riots occurring in the year preceding an
election increase the vote share of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata
Party by at least 5 percentage points.
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1 Introduction
Ethnic conflict afflicts many countries and has caused much suffering. More
than 14 percent of all ethnic minority groups have been involved in violent
conflict between 1945 and 1998 (Fearon, 2008). Some estimates put the num-
ber of deaths due to ethnic violence since World War II as high as 10 million
(Horowitz, 1985). Apart from the loss of innumerable lives, ethnic conflict also
affects societies in other ways. It has led to poverty (Easterly and Levine, 1997),
corruption (Mauro, 1995) and a decrease in the quality of government (La Porta
et al., 1999). Some ethnic conflicts even become full scale civil wars. Wars in
Sri Lanka, Kosovo and Sudan provide some of the deadliest examples. In other
cases, low-level conflict along ethnic lines occurs in small localised violent inci-
dents and does not turn into full scale armed conflict. Riots between the Hindu
majority and the Muslim minority in India, which is the subject of this study, fall
into this category. Other examples include race riots in the US (DiPasquale and
Glaeser, 1998), the Basque conflict in Spain (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003)
and religious conflict in Indonesia (Wilson, 2005). In all these cases, conflicts
have arisen in countries that are democratic to varying degrees and hold reg-
ular elections. There are studies showing that riots have direct negative eco-
nomic consequences (Collins and Margo, 2004; Matheson and Baade, 2004)
but the effect of such localised ethnic violence on elections is an interesting
and important question that has not been addressed in the literature thus far.
The question is also important economically since political turmoil or instabil-
ity has been shown to have significant adverse impact on economic indicators
such as growth (Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991). This paper draws upon data
on Hindu-Muslim riots in India to address this question.
This paper contributes to a much broader literature that examines the causes
and consequences of localised violence including riots (DiPasquale and Glaeser,
1998; Aidt and Franck, 2015), lynchings (Beck and Tolnay, 1990), terrorism
(Berrebi and Klor, 2008) and low-grade civil conflict (Berman et al., 2016),
as well as an emerging literature that uses economic and statistical methods
to evaluate the role of religion in society (see Iyer (2016) for an overview).
This paper also adds to the literature on voting behaviour. In models of ratio-
nal choice voters maximise their expected utilities under different candidates
or parties and choose their votes accordingly (Downs, 1957). In keeping with
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these models, the factors influencing voting behaviour include the allocation of
public goods and public services, bureaucratic efficiency and macroeconomic
policies (Kramer, 1971; Stigler, 1973; Fair, 1996). Broadening this model of
voter behaviour, identity can be included in the individual voter’s preferences,
thus making the ethnic, religious or racial identity of the candidate or the party
an important factor in elections (Glaeser, 2005; Fearon, 1999). Since identity
politics and political parties based on ethnic identities are widespread across
the world, ethnic identities become politically salient when the population sizes
of the ethnic groups are electorally viable (Posner, 2004) and when there is
increased political competition (Eifert et al., 2010). Our contribution then is
also to assess the impact of religious riots on the electoral results of a party
whose platform rests mainly on a religious identity, providing insights into the
direction and magnitude of the increased salience of ethno-religious identity on
voters’ decisions.
There have been some studies looking at the effect of violence on electoral
outcomes. Blattman (2009) finds that in northern Uganda, violence in a civil
war led to increased political participation in the form of increased voting and
community leadership. Aidt and Franck (2015) show that the so-called Swing
riots in England in 1830-31 increased the votes polled by pro-electoral reform
politicians. Berrebi and Klor (2008), in a study that is closest to ours, find that
terrorist attacks in Israel lead to increased electoral support for right-leaning
political parties. But the effect of small-scale localised ethnic violence, like
ethnic riots, on electoral outcomes has not been studied so far. We analyse this
issue in the context of Hindu-Muslim riots in India.
We investigate the effect of Hindu-Muslim riots on state government elec-
tions in 16 Indian states from 1981 to 2001. The riots data is obtained from a
data set constructed first by Varshney and Wilkinson (2004) and extended by
us, using individual news reports on Hindu-Muslim riots from The Times of In-
dia (Mumbai) newspaper. This data is supplemented with electoral data from
publicly available information on state assembly elections. The delimitation
document (Election Commission of India, 1976) is used to map electoral con-
stituencies onto administrative districts. The riots and electoral data combined
with data on demographics and public goods provision from decennial Indian
Censuses are used to construct our unique dataset.
We examine the effect of riots occurring in a district in the year preceding
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an election on the vote share obtained by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) in the election. We find that the effect is positive and significant and
remains robust to using different control variables and using fixed effects spec-
ifications to account for district-specific unobservables. We establish the causal
effect of riots on electoral results by using a unique instrument for riots. Our
instrument is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when an important Hindu
festival in a state in a given year falls on a Friday, which is the holy day for
Muslims. Anecdotal evidence suggests that religious riots are exacerbated by
festivals which are salient for particular religious groups, mainly because these
festivals are often associated with very visible public displays of religious faith
such as religious processions and collective worship. They are also associated
with contestations over public spaces. We hypothesize that such occurrences,
whose dates are based completely on lunar cycles, increase the probability of ri-
ots occurring and find that the data supports this hypothesis. Using this variable
to instrument for riots we find a positive and significant causal effect of riots on
the vote share of the BJP.
In using this instrument we do not preclude the possibility that political par-
ties know about such coincidences and use them to incite riots. If a political
party thinks that riots are electorally beneficial, then it will always want to in-
cite a riot. The coincidence of a Hindu festival falling on a Friday exogenously
reduces the cost of inciting the riot. Hence, the instrument continues to be valid
even if riots are politically motivated.
We also analyse the impact of possible under-reporting of riots on both our
OLS and IV estimates. We obtain a measure of under-reporting by comparing
our dataset to other sources and use the derived expressions for the biases to
correct our estimates. We also find that riots affect election outcomes in ad-
joining districts and that the effect decays with distance. After correcting for
under-reporting and distance, we find that a riot in the year preceding an elec-
tion can lead to an average increase in the BJP’s vote share by 5 percentage
points or more. We also find suggestive evidence showing that at least part of
the increase in vote share of the BJP is because of lower voter registration in
districts with above median Muslim population share.
Establishing exogenous causes for riots has been a major methodological
challenge for similar studies. A major contribution of this paper is that it over-
comes this challenge by using a unique religious festival instrument and demon-
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strates the magnitude and direction of the effect of riots on electoral results. The
most important implication of this paper is that it shows that voters system-
atically change their voting behaviour in response to ethnic tensions and this
results in substantial electoral gains for a party based on ethnic identity.
Section 2 provides a brief historical background of inter-communal relations
and electoral politics in India and reviews the literature on identity politics and
ethnic violence, both in India and more widely. Section 3 contains a description
of the data used. Section 4 explains the econometric specification and describes
the instrument used to identify the causal effect of religious riots on election re-
sults. Section 5 describes the regressions and their results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Religious Riots and Indian Electoral Politics3
2.1 Riots in historical perspective
The history of religious riots and politics in India can be divided into 4 phases:
pre-Independence, 1947-1980, 1981-2001, and from 2001 to the present.
In India, there is evidence of religion-related incidents of violence as early
as 1714 with a number of riots being reported in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.4 However, communal incidents were not a regular aspect of provin-
cial life in the nineteenth century (Indian statutory commission Report, 1930:
97-107). In the early twentieth century, there were localised riots in eastern and
northern India.5 In southern and western India, there were no significant riots
until 1928 when they affected Bangalore, Nasik, Surat and Hyderabad. There
were major riots in Calcutta and Bombay in 1926 and 1928 (see Iyer (2002) for
a more detailed discussion).
As the movement against colonial rule led by the Indian National Congress
gathered momentum, domestic politics began to be more communalised. The
3Our account here of the political history of post-Independent India draws heavily on the
work of Guha (2007). The history of religious riots is drawn from Iyer (2002).
4In the eighteenth century, there were communal riots in Ahmedabad in 1714; in Kashmir
in 1719-20, in Delhi in 1729 and in Vidarbha in 1786. For the nineteenth century, historians re-
port evidence of incidents in Benaras (1809-15), Koil (1820), Moradabad and Kashipur (1833),
Bareilly, Kanpur and Allahabad (1837-52) (Bayly, 1983).
5East Bengal (1907), Peshawar (1910), Ayodhya (1912), Agra (1913), Shahabad (1917)
and Katarpur (1918). Between 1920 and 1924 there were riots in Malegaon, Multan, Lahore,
Saharanpur, Amritsar, Allahabad, Calcutta, Delhi, Gulbarga, Kohat, Lucknow and Nagpur.
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Muslim League which claimed to represent the Muslims of the country, ex-
pressed mistrust in the secular rhetoric of the Congress, claiming that it repre-
sented the interests of Hindus only. The Civil Disobedience movement of 1942
yielded fresh outbursts of communal violence, which have been attributed by
some historians to imperial forces that tried to control the struggle for indepen-
dence. With the end of British rule imminent, the Muslim League’s demand
for the partition of India along religious lines became the flash point. Seri-
ous communal clashes took place, at times repeatedly, in Ahmedabad, Calcutta,
Noakhali, Bhagalpur, Dacca, Patna, Bombay and Allahabad in 1946-47. The
riots leading up to and continuing through the eventual partition of India and
the creation of Pakistan remain the most devastating episode of communal vio-
lence in modern India with estimates of the death toll ranging from 200,000 to
1 million people (Pandey, 2001).
After gaining independence in 1947, India formally became a democratic re-
public and adopted a written constitution in 1950, with the first general elections
being held in 1951. Although the Indian National Congress (INC), the party
credited with fighting for independence and then establishing a functioning
democracy in India, had had uninterrupted control of the central government un-
der Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, its control was by no means unchallenged.
Among the many parties opposing the Congress was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh
(BJS), a Hindu nationalist party formed in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee,
who resigned from Nehru’s cabinet, in consultation with the Rashtriya Swayam-
sevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist social organisation. Although there
were other smaller Hindu nationalist parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha and
the Rama Rajya Parishad, the BJS was the main representative of the Hindu na-
tionalist view. Its vote share grew from 3% in the first national elections in 1951
to 14% in the fifth national elections in 1971.
Post-independent India from 1947 to 1949 is not part of our dataset although
riots in the aftermath of partition continued during this period. In fact 1950, the
first year in our dataset, has the highest number of reported riots, 50, till the
1980s. The period from 1950-1980 was relatively calmer with an average of
about 16 riots reported per year. The period that we are concerned with in this
paper, 1981-2001, witnessed a much higher rate of incidents of about 47 riots
reported per year from across the country. The political events that accompanied
this increase in violence are described below.
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The 1970s saw division in the ranks of the INC and the Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi adopting increasingly populist rhetoric to counter it. Democracy
was suspended by Indira Gandhi with the imposition of Emergency in 1975.
Leaders of opposition parties including BJS were arrested and the press was
censored. The Emergency was lifted in 1977 and elections were conducted
at the centre as well as in several states. The Janata Party, an agglomeration
of parties ranging from the left-leaning Socialist Party to the Hindu nationalist
BJS, came to power to form the first non-Congress government at the centre
since independence. The government was short lived and collapsed in 1980.
The next round of elections saw the resurgence of the INC under Indira Gandhi
at the centre as well as in several states. The leaders of the erstwhile BJS left the
Janata party to regroup and formed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980.
The INC retained control of the centre first under Indira and later under
her son Rajiv Gandhi, till 1989. The assassination of Indira Gandhi by her
Sikh bodyguards in 1984 was followed by a spate of anti-Sikh riots. During
this time, the BJP along with other subsidiary associations of the RSS started a
movement to build a temple at the site of the disputed Babri Mosque or Babri
Masjid in Ayodhya. The movement helped the BJP gain popular support and
it came to power in several states. In the general election of 1989 the BJP
gathered 11% of the votes and was the third largest party in parliament after
the INC and the Janata Dal, a centrist remnant of the erstwhile Janata Party.
It supported a government of the National Front, a coalition of the Janata Dal
with some regional parties, under Prime Minister V.P. Singh. This government
also did not last long, with the BJP withdrawing support primarily because of
V.P. Singh’s efforts to stop the Babri Masjid agitation being supported by the
BJP. In the subsequent elections in 1991, the BJP gathered 20% of the votes and
established itself as the main opposition party to the INC government led by
P.V. Narasimha Rao. In December 1992, the Babri Masjid movement led by the
BJP culminated in the demolition of the disputed structure by militant Hindu
nationalists. A spate of riots erupted in different parts of the country including
Mumbai and Surat.
These riots were followed by a period of comparative calm till 2001. Dur-
ing this time a BJP led government came to power for the first time in 1996,
albeit only for a period of 13 days. Eventually the BJP led National Demo-
cratic Alliance ruled at the centre from 1998 to 2004. In 2002, a series of ri-
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ots erupted in the state of Gujarat, where BJP leaders were allegedly directly
involved. These riots left at least a thousand people dead and forced approx-
imately 98,000 people into refugee camps (Jha, 2014). This was followed by
a period of relative calm until 2013, when riots again broke out in Kishtwar in
Jammu and in Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh. The involvement of political
leaders in both these riots has been the subject of many articles (Muralidharan,
2014; Rao et al., 2014) and the results of the general elections overwhelmingly
and in an unprecedented manner favoured the BJP in both these regions. The
question of whether this substantial swing towards the BJP was because of the
riots or was part of a nation-wide swing that led to the party’s victory in the
elections, is difficult to answer. This paper answers exactly the same question,
but for previous state elections during 1981-2001 and finds that riots did indeed
contribute substantially to increasing the BJP’s vote share in that period.
2.2 Riots and politics
There have been a number of studies on Hindu-Muslim riots in India. Varshney
(2002) describes the role of civic institutions in preventing such inter-ethnic
violence. Bohlken and Sergenti (2010) find that low economic growth increases
the probability of riots occurring, while Mitra and Ray (2014) find that growth
in Muslim per-capita expenditures increases the chances of future communal
violence while the increase in Hindu per-capita expenditures has negative or no
effect. Field et al. (2008) find that rent control restricted the locational choices
of workers thus preventing segregation and hence leading to riots in Gujarat.
The relationship between electoral politics and Hindu-Muslim riots in India
has been explored in a few studies. Wilkinson (2004) shows that riots are less
likely in states with higher effective number of political parties and where the
ruling party depends on minority votes. At the local level, using data from 167
towns in the state of Uttar Pradesh, he finds that higher electoral competition
measured as the closeness of state elections in towns leads to the higher like-
lihood of riots. Varshney and Gubler (2012) present criticisms of both results.
They suggest that the role of the state governments might have been overstated
with respect to the first result and they raise certain methodological objections
about the mapping of electoral constituencies onto towns for the second one.
Wilkinson’s second result finds support from Jha (2014), whose study focussed
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on the state of Gujarat finding that close elections do indeed predict a higher
likelihood of riots at the level of towns. Jha (2014) also finds significant effects
of historical inter-ethnic relationships on the duration of riots.
Apart from electoral competition, another strand of the literature focusses
on the relationship between the electoral results of the majority identity party, in
this case the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the incidence of riots. Pathania
and Tandon (2011) investigate the relationship between the BJP’s results in the
1989 and 1991 national elections and the incidence of riots. They find that the
share of close elections won by the BJP is positively correlated with the severity
of subsequent riots, as measured by the number of people killed or injured or
as the duration of the riot. They do not find any correlation between the results
of the BJP and the frequency of riots. They do find a correlation between riots
and the number of close elections, similar to the electoral competition literature
discussed above. Nellis et al. (2015) find that a victory of the Indian National
Congress in close elections for the state assembly between 1962 and 2000 led
to a reduction in Hindu-Muslim riots. Blakeslee (2013) shows that the BJP’s
campaign involving its leaders touring northern India as part of the Babri Masjid
agitation led to an increase in the party’s vote share in the subsequent national
elections in 1991, as well as an increase in the probability of riots.
Although the causes of riots and the role political competition may play in
them have been studied in great detail, there is no evidence regarding the impact
of the riots themselves on electoral results. The assessment of this impact is
essential to understand the incentives that ethnic identity-based political parties
have in planning their electoral strategy.
Jha (2014) finds a positive correlation between the duration of riots and an
increase in BJP’s vote share but does not establish a causal relationship. The
main focus of that paper is the effect of historical inter-ethnic relationships on
present day inter-ethnic dynamics reflected in riots and elections. Brass (2003)
in his detailed study of riots and politics in Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh describes
the complex relationship between politics and ethnic relations. He writes,
“The gist of my argument on the relationship between party pol-
itics and riots were stated in one of my earlier works as follows:
“there is a continuum from political rivalry leading to communal
riots to political rivalry feeding on communal riots.” The contin-
uum may, however start at either end, that is, from political rivalry
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to riots as well as from communal riots to intensified political ri-
valry. However, the sequence in Aligarh has been primarily in the
latter direction, that is, communal riots have preceded and have
led to intensification of interparty competition. The mechanisms
that lead to this intensification arise from the tendencies that follow
from riots to foster increased communal solidarity and polarization,
which in turn are promoted by political parties and/or individual
candidates who stand to benefit from such solidarity and polariza-
tion. The resultant communalization and polarization in turn re-
duce the electoral prospects of parties and candidates who stand for
secular political practices, intercommunal cooperation, and class or
caste/baradari mobilization rather than communal mobilization.”
It is this change in “electoral prospects” that we attempt to elucidate more
clearly here.
3 Data
India has a quasi-federal system of government where power is shared between
the central government and the state governments. The control over law and
order, and hence the handling of riots, is within the state government’s ambit.
As of 2000, India consisted of 25 states. For this analysis we only look at large
states with population greater than 10 million as at the 2001 census. There are
sixteen such states that account for 96% of India’s population. These states are
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
This includes three states – Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Uttarakhand - that were
created in 2000. We collected data for 21 years from 1981 to 2001. We stop at
2001 as there was a delimitation that made the new constituencies not compara-
ble with previous years. Data for all variables is at the level of the district. These
are administrative divisions and most public data is available at this level. Over
time the districts have been divided and merged to create new ones. We use the
districts as defined in the delimitation order released by the Election Commis-
sion of India in 1976 and match the rest of the data to that. This gives us a panel
dataset of 339 districts over 21 years.
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3.1 Elections
Electoral data for state elections was collected from statistical reports released
by the Election Commission. We have used data from state elections rather
than from national elections as there were only six national elections during
the 21 year period and it would be difficult to disassociate the effects of the
elections with that of random events happening coterminously. If we consider
state elections then there were elections in at least one of the sixteen states in 18
of the 21 years in consideration.
India has a five-year electoral cycle.6 So, we have at least four and at most
five elections for every state except Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab, which
have three, in this twenty-one year period. Only state-wide election results were
considered – by-election results were ignored. Each state has a number of elec-
toral constituencies, ranging from 87 for Jammu and Kashmir to 425 for Uttar
Pradesh, that elect representatives for the state legislative assemblies. These
electoral constituencies are grouped into administrative districts each contain-
ing on average eleven constituencies. We use the district instead of the electoral
constituency as our geographical unit as all the other data is available at district
level. It is still a reasonably small unit since we have 339 districts in the 16
states we are considering. We aggregate the election data that is available at
the constituency level to the district level using the official delimitation order
(Election Commission of India, 1976). We construct the vote share of a party
as a fraction with the numerator being the total votes polled by the party in the
district and the denominator being the total number of valid votes cast in all
those constituencies in the district in which the party fielded a candidate. The
main dependent variable we use is the vote share of the BJP in a district in an
election.
We also construct a control variable BJP government, which is a binary vari-
able that has a value of 1 when the BJP is part of the state government for a given
district in a given year. This is important because which party controls the state
government may play an important role in influencing both electoral results and
the occurrence of riots.
6Sometimes early elections are called due to various reasons like no party getting a clear
majority or the state government being dismissed by the central government
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3.2 Riots
Our main explanatory variable is the occurrence of riots. Data for the riots
that occurred between 1980 and 2000 in these 16 states was extracted from a
larger dataset that extends from 1950-2006. The initial dataset from 1950-1995
was constructed by Varshney and Wilkinson (2004) and it was extended using
individual newspaper reports on riots from the Mumbai edition of The Times
of India, held in the India Office archives of The British Library.Most of the
observations included the names of towns, villages, and in some cases districts.
Using this information, each riot happening in one of the 16 states was matched
with one of the 339 districts. The data includes the number of riots that occurred
in a year, the duration of the riots and the reported cause of the riot.
Since each observation is a newspaper report of a riot, the actual intensity of
the riot that is being reported varies. As shown in Table 1, there are riots that
go on for many days. In other cases, reports of riots from the same place are
reported over several days and are hence coded as separate riots in our data. So,
it is acknowledged that there is some ambiguity over the intensity of violence
that each reported incident represents. For this reason we choose to focus on the
extensive rather than on the intensive margin. We construct the primary variable
of concern as a binary variable indicating if at least one riot occurred in a given
district in a given year. Of a total of 7119 district-year observations, 499 had
at least one riot, so the unconditional probability of having at least one riot in a
year in a district is 7%.
We also geo-coded the location of each riot. Mapping this on to the loca-
tion of each district allowed us not only to assign the district in which the riot
occurred but also to measure the distance of any other district to the location of
the riot.
Table 1 provides further details of our riots data. More than 70% of district-
years that had riots had only one riot in that year. Most of the district-years that
had riots had them for only 1 day, but the number of observations of more than
5 days is also significant. Figure 1 shows the variation in number of riots over
years. Years 1986 and 1990 have exceptionally high number of riots and we
show later that our results are robust to dropping these two years.
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Table 1: The reported number and duration of riots in 339 Indian districts be-
tween 1980-2000
Total observations: 7119
Observations with at least one riot: 499
Number of riots Obs. Duration Obs.
1 357 1 day 271
2-5 130 2-5 days 159
>5 12 >5 days 69
Figure 1: Number of riots by year in all 339 districts
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3.3 Demographics and public goods
Demographics play an important role in electoral results and may also be a
factor in the occurrence of riots. Hence, we use religious demographic compo-
sition, urbanisation and literacy as control variables. The district-wise distribu-
tion of these across the country was obtained from three Censuses from 1981
to 2001. A number of changes in the organisation of districts have occurred
between 1981 and 2001. A number of new districts were created and old dis-
tricts were re-named. We conducted a mapping of the districts in each Census
year compared to those used in the delimitation document issued by the Election
Commission in 1976. The value of these variables in non-Census years was ob-
tained by linearly interpolating between two consecutive Censuses. Hence we
obtain an approximate value of the variable in each year in each district. Among
these variables, one would expect the Muslim population share to play an im-
portant role. The share of Muslims ranged from almost 0 to more than 98%.
However, the distribution is highly skewed with the median at 8.7% and with
three-fourths of the districts having less than 14% of Muslims.
The provision of public goods may be a factor influencing the choices of
voters. Their effect on riots is not self-evident but there is some literature linking
economic factors to ethnic violence (Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010; Mitra and
Ray, 2014) and we use public goods provision to control for these effects. We
again use Census data to obtain the percentage of households that have access
to tap water and the percentage of households that have access to electricity. As
before, we interpolate linearly between Census years to obtain values for other
years.
4 Econometric specification and identification strat-
egy
4.1 Econometric specification
We estimate the effect of riots on electoral results using this panel dataset. Our
basic specification is as follows. The subscripts have their usual meanings.
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BJP vote shareit = α+βI Riotit−1+ γ1BJP governmentit−1
+ γ2Demographic controlsit + γ3Public goods provisionit
+ γ4Time trendst +δi+ εit (I)
Here δi represents district fixed effects. Our main explanatory variable is
Riotit−1, which indicates the occurrence of at least one riot in the district in the
year before the elections. Here we use the calendar year rather than a twelve
month period preceding the election. This is because the year of election is
largely pre-decided as it follows the electoral cycle, but the month of election
is fixed by the Election Commission taking many factors into account, and riots
could be one of them. We do use the preceding twelve month period in one of
the robustness checks and find that the results are unchanged.
A list of variables with summary statistics is provided in Table 2. The num-
ber of observations of the dependent variable, BJP vote share, is 1345 because
we include only election years, and hence this results in a very unbalanced panel
data set. The observations for some of the control variables is lower than this
because of some missing data in the Censuses.
While estimating this specification would give us the correlation between
riots and BJP vote share, interpreting it as a causal effect is problematic. It may
be the case that riots are caused in expectation of a good result for the BJP.
Another possibility could be the presence of time-varying unobservables that
affect both electoral results and the likelihood of riots.
In order to establish the causal effect of riots on electoral results we con-
struct an instrument for riots. Anecdotal evidence from the newspaper reports
that are used to construct the riots data shows that a number of riots tend to oc-
cur when religious processions are taken out on days of religious significance.
These processions are both visible and vocal. For Muslims, Fridays are impor-
tant religiously as special weekly prayers are held in mosques on those days.
These generally result in a large congregation of people in the area surrounding
the mosque. Hence, Hindu festivals falling on Fridays may lead to contestations
over public spaces. The Hindus have a number of festivals of differing impor-
tance depending on the state and region. The day on which these festivals fall
depends on the Hindu lunar calendar. Hence, we contend that a year when, in a
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Table 2: Description of the main variables
Name Type Definition Mean
(S.D.)
Observations
BJP vote
shareit
Fraction The aggregate vote share
of BJP in election in dis-
trict i in year t across
all those constituencies in
which BJP fielded a can-
didate
0.25
(0.16)
1345
BJP seat
shareit
Fraction The seat share of BJP in
election in district i in
year t across all those con-
stituencies in which BJP
fielded a candidate
0.21
(0.27)
1345
Riotit−1 Binary Equals one if a riot oc-
curred in district i in year
t-1
0.08
(0.27)
1345
BJP
governmentit−1
Binary Equals one if BJP is part
of the government of the
state in year t-1
0.13
(0.34)
1345
Muslim popula-
tion shareit
Percentage Percentage of the popula-
tion that is Muslim in dis-
trict i in year t
11.75
(12.46)
1337
Urbanisationit Percentage Percentage of the popula-
tion that lives in urban ar-
eas in district i in year t
22.46
(15.84)
1337
Literacyit Percentage Percentage of the popula-
tion that is literate in dis-
trict i in year t
43.02
(14.18)
1337
Tap waterit Percentage Percentage of households
in district i in year t that
have access to tap water
29.47
(19.38)
1337
Electricityit Percentage Percentage of households
in district i in year t that
have access to electricity
40.81
(23.73)
1337
Festivalit−1 Binary Equals 1 if an important
Hindu festival in district i
falls on a Friday in year t-
1
0.47
(0.50)
1345
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given region, an important Hindu festival also falls on a Friday, the chances of a
riot happening are higher. Moreover, these riots may happen on the festival day
itself or may be the result of communal tensions created on the festival day or in
anticipation of it. Hence, in keeping with our logic, we construct an instrument,
Festival, as follows: First we select the five most important Hindu festivals for
each state. In this we are guided by the public holidays declared and published
officially in each state by the state government. Hence, major festivals such
as Dushehra and Diwali that are celebrated across the country were used for
all states but festivals such as Holi or Ganesh Chaturthi, which are more local,
were used for the respective states in which they are predominantly celebrated
(for example in this case in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra respectively).
The festivals chosen for each state are given in the Appendix. For districts in
each state, the instrument was set equal to one for the year in which one of
these festivals fell on a Friday, and it was set equal to zero for all other years.
Hence, we construct a completely exogenous instrument with variation in both
cross-sectional and time dimensions. As we use this instrument in fixed effects
regressions, any state-specific endogeneity inherent in the historical importance
of a festival in a given state, is eliminated.
However, there are two reasons why the exclusion restriction required for
the validity of the instrument may be violated. The first reason is that while we
have assumed that a riot occurring in a district will influence the election results
only in that district, this may not be the case. The area of the electoral effect
of the riot may extend beyond the district in which it occurs. If this is the case
then the instrumental variable, which is common for all districts within the same
state, can affect election results in a district not only through riots occurring in
that district but through riots occurring in adjoining districts as well. This would
violate the exclusion restriction. The second reason could be the under reporting
of riots. The instrument could affect the election results through riots which are
not reported in the newspaper, thus leading to a bias in the IV coefficient. We
deal with these issues in the following subsections.
4.2 Area of effect of riots
The direct effect of the instrument on the dependent variable can be crudely
interpreted as the difference in average vote share of the BJP between the elec-
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tion years that did and did not have a Hindu festival falling on a Friday in the
preceding year. As the mean value of the Festival variable is around 0.53, this
coincidence is fairly common. Hence, a little more than half of the election
years would have had this coincidence in the previous year. But the occurrence
of a riot in a district is very rare. The exclusion restriction would imply that the
increase in the average of the vote shares in a district in all the election years that
had the festival coincidence is because of that rare occurrence of a riot that may
have happened in one of those years. This may not be the case. The election
years in which the festival coincidence did not cause a riot in the same district
in the preceding year could have experienced a riot in one of the adjoining dis-
tricts, and the increased average vote share could be because of these riots as
well. Hence, if we account for the riots in adjoining districts, we should be able
to overcome this violation of the exclusion restriction.
Since we have the geographical coordinates of the riots, we can construct
a variable that is 1 for district i in year t, when there is no riot in district i
and there is at least one riot within a radius of x km from the district centre.
The district centre is defined as the location of the largest city in the district.
Introducing this variable in specification (I) does account for the effect of riots
in adjoining districts, but it leads to two problems. One is that the occurrence
of riots in adjoining districts is very likely endogenous and since it is correlated
with the explanatory variable and the instrument, it would be contaminating the
coefficient estimate. The second problem is that the choice of the radius of effect
x is arbitrary and the coefficient estimates are found to be sensitive to the value
chosen. This is to be expected as the effect of riots happening just outside x is
assumed to be zero, and any change in the value may just include or just exclude
some riots leading to changes in the coefficient.
To overcome these limitations, we construct a new explanatory variable by
making the assumption that when there is no riot in district i itself, the election
results are influenced by the nearest riot occurring in the preceding year and the
effect is lower as the distance of the riot from the district is higher. We define the
new variable Riot ′it−1 as the function φ(dit−1), where dit−1 is the distance of the
riot nearest to district i in year t-1, and φ is a decay function such that φ(0) = 1
and φ(x)→ 0 as x→∞. Using this we obtain our preferred specification which
is given below.
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BJP vote shareit = α+βIIRiot ′it−1+ γ1BJP governmentit−1
+ γ2Demographic controlsit + γ3Public goods provisionit
+ γ4Time trendst +δi+ εit (II)
The coefficient βII has the same interpretation as the earlier coefficient. It
implies that the vote share of the BJP in state elections in a district will increase
by βII if at least one riot happened in the same district in the previous year.
The first stage regression with the instrument also has a simple interpreta-
tion. This explanatory variable Riot ′it−1 reflects a kind of ‘riot exposure’. A
Hindu festival falling on a Friday may lead to a riot in the district or in nearby
areas and the probability of it leading to a riot decreases as the distance from
the district increases. Hence, the instrument directly affects ‘riot exposure’. As
the instrumental variable varies only at the state-year level, all districts in a state
where the instrument takes the value 1 will have higher predicted ‘riot exposure’
as riots are more likely to occur in that state.
4.3 Under-reporting of riots
As we are using newspaper reports of riots, it is likely that not every riot gets
reported. This under-reporting may bias our estimates. In order to derive an
expression for this bias, we make three assumptions regarding the nature of
reporting of riots.
1. There is no over reporting, i.e. the newspaper never reports a riot that has
not actually happened.
2. Conditional on a district having had one or more actual riots, the proba-
bility of at least one riot from that district getting reported is independent
of the instrumental variable, i.e. riots that are caused because of Hindu
festivals falling on a Friday are as likely to be reported as other riots.
3. If a district has had one or more riots in the year before elections, then the
effect of those riots on the election results is independent of whether they
are reported or not.
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The third assumption is most likely not true - simply because newspaper report-
ing of the riots may increase the effect on elections. But making the assumption
leads to over-estimation of the bias. This implies that the coefficient estimate
after correcting for under reporting would be a lower bound for the coefficient.
Let the actual probability of at least one riot occurring in a district be λ and
given that one or more riots have occurred in the district, the probability of at
least one riot being reported be p. We show in the Appendix that for regressions
without other covariates, the OLS and IV estimates, βˆOLS and βˆIV respectively,
calculated using the reported riots would be related to the actual OLS and IV
estimates, βˆ ∗OLS and βˆ
∗
IV respectively, as follows.
βˆOLS =
1−λ
1− pλ βˆ
∗
OLS
βˆIV =
1
p
βˆ ∗IV
The bias on the OLS estimate is negative and bounded by λ , while the bias
on the IV estimate is positive and unbounded. We can calculate the bias by
obtaining an estimate of the reporting rate p. We use two studies that provide
data on all the riots that happened in a particular place in a given time period.
We compare these with the riots reported in the newspapers that we used to get
an estimate of the reporting rate.
Jha (2014) investigates Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat between 27th Febru-
ary and 15th April, 2002. He augments newspaper and online reports with eye
witness refugee testimonials and finds a total of 30 riots in this time period. The
Times of India, Mumbai edition, that we have used in our dataset, following the
methodology adopted by Varshney-Wilkinson, reports only 23. This leads to a
reporting rate p= 0.77. But this is not strictly comparable to our case as all riots
happen in a very short span of time and this particular year 2002 is also outside
of our sample period 1981-2001.
A similar exercise using data from Brass (2003) consisting of riots in the city
of Aligarh from 1981 until 1995 is more informative. Brass provides informa-
tion on riots and “riotous periods” using various records including bureaucratic
reports and data from NGOs allowing us to check for reporting rates over a long
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time span. In our dataset Aligarh has had riots in 7 out of the 15 years between
1981 and 1995. Brass provides information about two more riotous years that
are not included in our dataset. The resulting reporting rate is p = 0.78 and is
comparable to the one obtained from Jha (2014).
4.4 Other concerns with the exclusion restriction
The validity of the instrument can still be questioned if the occurrence of Hindu
festivals falling on a Friday affects vote share directly and not only through riots.
It can be argued that the tensions created between Hindus and Muslims due to
contestations over public space during such a coincidence could directly lead the
Hindus to vote for the BJP. Such tensions at the local level may well change the
voting behaviour of the small number of people actually involved in a particular
altercation, but will not create any significant impact in the vote share across a
district with a population of around a million people. A riot can change voting
behaviour through a number of mechanisms, discussed in a subsequent section,
through which people who were not directly involved in the rioting change their
voting behaviour as they are made more aware of the incident or are indirectly
affected by it. An altercation that does not result in any ’incident’ cannot affect
other people in this way. The other argument could be that the festival coinci-
dence leads to a number of such small unreported altercations across the district
that can then lead cumulatively to a change in voting behaviour. If such a phe-
nomenon is so widespread then it would be surprising that it has escaped the
attention of journalists and academics who scrutinise Indian elections in great
detail. On the other hand, the effect of festivals on riots (Jaffrelot, 2010; Ke-
savan, 2014), and that of riots on elections (Brass, 2003; Muralidharan, 2014),
have been widely reported.
There could be any number of explanations for how the festival coincidence
creates something, as Alfred Marshall (1920) wrote albeit in a different context7,
“in the air” that leads people to change their voting behaviour, but in the absence
of a quantifiable measure of such an effect, it is difficult for us to check for or
indeed to control for it. We would argue that even if such an effect is present,
it is likely to be small and local and may not create a significant bias in our
7Marshall wrote: "The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the
air, and children learn many of them unconsciously."
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estimates.
4.5 Year fixed effects
Year fixed effects are intended to account for unobservable time shocks that af-
fect both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable or the instrument.
In our case, the instrument is completely exogenous and so the purpose of year
fixed effects would be to check for the possibility that by chance in a few of the
election years in which BJP did well, a Hindu festival happened to fall on a Fri-
day in the preceding year and this is driving our result. While we do indirectly
check this by dropping some years and states as robustness checks, we cannot
directly check for this possibility using year fixed effects because of the lack of
cross-sectional variation in the instrument.
On doing an analysis of variance of the instrumental variable on variables
indexing the district and the year, we find that the two variables explain 56%
of the variation and from that 98% is explained by the year variable. Hence,
the instrumental variable has very little cross-sectional variation and precludes
us from using year fixed effects in our preferred specification. Instead we use
a quadratic time trend to account for changing popularity of the BJP. However,
we can introduce cross-sectional variation in the instrument by changing our
specification slightly. thus allowing us to introduce year fixed effects.
So far we have been looking at the extensive margin of riots to avoid making
any assumptions about the nature of the cumulative effect of multiple riots. We
now assume a linear cumulative effect, which implies that we can add all the
(distance weighted) riots and check for their total effect on elections. We use
a new explanatory variable All Riotsit−1, which is given by ∑
j=1 to n(t)
φ(di jt−1).
Here, j indicates an individual riot and n(t) indicates the total number of riots
in year t. φ(.) is the same Gaussian weighting function that we have used ear-
lier. di jt−1 indicates the distance between district i and riot j in year t-1. The
specification would now be
BJP vote shareit = α+βIIIAll Riotsit−1+ γ1BJP governmentit−1
+ γ2Demographic controlsit + γ3Public goods provisionit
+ηt +Region speci f ic time trendsit +δi+ εit (III)
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We have replaced the quadratic time trend with individual year fixed effects
ηt and have also included region specific time trends. We construct a similar ex-
pression for the instrumental variable for All riots, given by ∑
k=1 to 338
φ(dik)Festivalkt−1.
Here, k is a district and dik denotes the distance between districts i and k. Using
this instrument implies that a district that is closer to a lot of other districts that
are experiencing the coincidence of a Hindu festival falling on a Friday, is likely
to have more riots happening near it. This specification allows us to exploit the
variation in distances between districts that have the coincidence and those that
do not, to generate the cross-sectional variation necessary for using year fixed
effects.
We do not use specification III as our preferred specification as the inter-
pretation of the coefficient estimate is not straight forward and is based on the
strong assumption that the distance-adjusted effect of all riots happening in the
country on the election results of a given district can be added up linearly. The
purpose of this specification is only to test if the effect of riots on elections,
instrumented by an analogue of the Festival variable, disappears once we intro-
duce year fixed effects.
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Here we will present all results using the preferred specification i.e. specifica-
tion II. Results from specification I are provided in the Appendix for compari-
son. To estimate specification II, we need to specify the decay function φ . We
choose a Gaussian decay function as it is simple and widely used. The selection
of the standard deviation parameter for the function still poses a problem. In
Table 3 we tabulate the results of IV regressions that include all controls, for a
number of values of the standard deviation. The average area of a district as of
the 1981 Census was around 8000 square kilometres8, which corresponds to a
circle with radius of approximately 50 kms. Hence, we start with a value of 100
kms for the standard deviation and increase in steps of 50 kms, as shown in the
first column of the table. The coefficient estimate for βII , shown in the second
8The surface area of India is 3.288 million square kilometres, which is divided into 412
districts to obtain the average district size.
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Table 3: Regression results for different standard deviations for φ(.)
SD Coefficient SE First RMS AIC BIC
in km estimate stage KP
F-stat
100 0.072** 0.037 123.8 0.0988 - 2754.0 - 2707.2
150 0.065** 0.033 154.4 0.0984 - 2764.4 - 2717.6
200 0.066** 0.033 164.7 0.0984 - 2764.7 - 2718.0
250 0.071** 0.036 161.8 0.0986 - 2760.6 - 2713.8
300 0.078** 0.04 153.6 0.0988 - 2755.0 - 2708.2
The dependent variable is BJP vote shareit . Coefficient estimates shown are for the ex-
planatory variable Riot ′it−1, instrumented by the variable Festivalit−1. Other controls include
BJP governmentit−1, demographic and public goods controls, district fixed effects and quadratic
time trend. Standard errors are clustered at district level.
SD: Standard deviation, SE: Standard error, RMS: Root mean squared error. AIC: Akaike’s
information criterion, BIC: Bayesian information criterion.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
column, is relatively stable and is approximately in the range of 0.065 to 0.08
for the standard deviation up to the value of 300 kms. The value of 200 kms
provides the best fit as measured by the smallness of the root mean squared er-
ror, Akaike’s information criterion as well as the Bayesian information criterion.
Hence, we use this value for all subsequent regressions.
Table 4 presents the results of different regressions of BJP voteshareit on
Riot ′it−1. As we have panel data we can use a fixed effects regression to account
for district specific time invariant heterogeneity. We use a quadratic time trend
to account for country level variation in the popularity of the BJP. We control
for whether or not the BJP was part of the government using the binary variable
BJP governmentit−1 We also add controls for demographic variables, namely
the percentage of Muslims in the population, urbanisation and literacy; and vari-
ables that capture public goods provision, namely the availability of electricity
and tap water.
Columns 1 and 2 show the results of the structural fixed effects regression,
with and without controls. We find that the coefficient of Riot ′it−1 is positive and
significant and is robust to the addition of control variables. The magnitude of
approximately 0.04 indicates that a riot is correlated with an increase in the vote
share of the BJP by approximately 4 percentage points.
We cannot interpret this correlation as a causal effect of riots on vote share
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because of potential confounding factors. The first possibility is reverse causa-
tion. It may be the case that riots are caused in expectation of a good result by
the BJP. Another possibility is the presence of time-varying district specific un-
observables that affect both electoral results and the likelihood of riots. To deal
with these problems, we use an instrumental variable to isolate the exogenous
variation in riots.
The instrument we use, as described earlier, is a dummy variable that takes
a value 1 whenever an important Hindu festival in a district in a given year
falls on a Friday, which is a holy day for Muslims. We hypothesize that such
occurrences will lead to increased probability of riots. The first stage regressions
shown in Table 5 support this hypothesis. The coefficient of the instrument
Festivalit−1 is positive and highly significant and with an F-statistic much above
the cut-off norm of 10. Hence, this instrument satisfies the first requirement of
being relevant, i.e. it is correlated with the endogenous variable. The second
requirement for the instrument is that it should be exogenous. The dates of
Hindu festivals depend on the Hindu lunar calendar and there cannot be any
reason to think that the dates on which Hindu festivals fall should affect election
results other than through riots. Any possible endogeneity introduced by state
specific choice of festivals is eliminated in the fixed effects regression.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 show the results of the reduced form regressions
and columns 5 and 6 show the results of the fixed effects 2-stage least squares
regressions using Festivalit−1 as an instrument for Riotit−1. We find that the
coefficient of Riotit−1 is positive and significant. We use the Kleibergen-Paap F-
statistic to check for weak instrument bias since the standard errors are not i.i.d.
but clustered at the level of districts (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). The Stock-
Yogo critical value (Stock and Yogo, 2005) for i.i.d. errors at 10% maximal IV
size is 16.38. In comparison to that the F-statistic is higher in all cases. Hence,
we conclude that weak instrument bias is not significant in our case.
The IV coefficients should be interpreted as Local Average Treatment Ef-
fects (LATE). The effect here is the average effect of the increase in probability
of riots that occurs because of Hindu festivals falling on Fridays. It may be
the case that the effect of riots on vote share is heterogeneous and is particu-
larly high in those places where riots do result from the coincidence of a festival
falling on a particular day.
These estimates are based on reported riots. As mentioned earlier, under-
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Table 5: First stage regressions of Riot ′it−1 and Riot
′
it−1 on instrumental variable
Festivalit−1
Dependent variable Riot’it−1 Riotit−1
1 2 3 4
FE FE FE FE
Festivalit−1 0.262 ∗∗∗ 0.274 ∗∗∗ 0.071 ∗∗∗ 0.077 ∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018)
Other controls No Yes No Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat 188 165 20 19
Number of districts 334 334 334 334
Number of observations 1341 1333 1341 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
reporting of riots may bias the estimates. We had derived reporting rates from
two other studies in the previous section. If we use the lower value of reporting
rate p= 0.77 and apply the under reporting correction to the coefficient estimate,
we get the corrected value of the estimate as 0.051. As mentioned earlier, this
value is a lower bound and the actual coefficient will be between this and 0.066
to the extent that reporting influences the effect of riots on elections. Hence, the
occurrence one or more riots in a district in the year before an election leads to
an average increase of 5.1 to 6.6 percentage points in the vote share of the BJP.
5.2 Year fixed effects and region specific time trends
In Table 6 we first show that if we use year fixed effects then we lose power in
our regressions. We also use region specific time trends, dividing the states into
five regions.9 We can see that for the IV regressions shown in columns 1 and
2, the point estimates are close to the original value of 0.066 but the standard
errors are large. This is because the instrument has very little cross-sectional
variation.
As mentioned in the previous section, we use a different specification, spec-
9North- Punjab, Haryana and Jammu & Kashmir, Central- Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Mad-
hya Pradesh and Bihar, East- West Bengal, Assam and Orissa, West- Gujarat and Maharashtra,
South- Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
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Table 6: Regressions with time fixed effects and region specific time trends
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
1 2 3 4 5
IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.039 0.048
(0.117) (0.033)
All riotsit−1 0.024 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.021 ∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes
Regional time trend No Yes No Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend No Yes No Yes No
KP F-stat 8.1 170.0 50.2 573.0 54.6
No. of districts 334 334 334 334 334
No. of observations 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
ification III, to introduce year fixed effects. The explanatory variable is now
All riotsit−1, which is the sum of all riots in the previous year multiplied with
the distance decay function. The results for the regressions are given in columns
3, 4 and 5 of Table 6. The coefficients are positive and significant but have a
different interpretation to coefficients of earlier regressions. This coefficient
implies that every riot that happens in a district in the year before elections in-
creases the BJP’s vote share by 2.1 percentage points. The average number of
riots in a district, conditional on having at least one riot is 1.62. Multiplying
this coefficient by 1.62, we get 3.4 as the average effect of having at least one
riot, which is within one standard deviation of the coefficient obtained from our
preferred specification in Table 4.
5.3 Mechanisms
In this section we discuss the mechanisms through which riots can change voting
behaviour. The arguments in this section are speculative, largely because it is
difficult to pin down the exact mechanism of individual behaviour using district
level aggregates. Nevertheless we think it is still important to try to interpret
some of the trends and correlations that we see in the data. There are two ways in
28
Table 7: Regressions with different measures of voter participation as dependent
variables
Dependent variable Turnoutit Registration Eligibleit Registeredit Votedit
ratioit
1 2 3 4 5
IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 - 0.022 - 0.048 ∗∗ 18360 -59221 -69403
(0.020) (0.020) (53453) (58779) 50468
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
KP F-stat 165 165 165 165 165
Number of districts 334 334 334 334 334
Number of observations 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
which religious riots could change voting behaviour - change in whether people
vote or not, and change in the party they vote for.
A change in the decision of eligible voters on whether to vote or not can
change election results. If riots results in fewer number of voters from the mi-
nority religion turn out to vote, this would favour the party representing the
majority religion. To check for the presence of this mechanism, we look for the
effect of the variable Riot ′it−1 on election turnout, measured as the ratio of votes
cast to the number of voters on the voter list. We find that the impact on turnout
is negative but small and not statistically significant (Table 7).
Since we are looking at riots that happened in the year before the election, it
is possible that the effect is not on the turnout ratio but on the number of voters
on the voter list. We construct a variable Registration ratioit as the ratio of the
voters on the electoral rolls to the total eligible voting population. Data on the
population of voting age was collected from the decennial censuses and values
for the intermediate years were imputed.
We find that there is a significant negative impact on the registration ratio.
Further, we separately run regression with dependent variables as number of
people eligible to vote, number of people on the electoral rolls, and the number
of votes cast. Although all the coefficient estimates are statistically not signifi-
cant, the point estimates seem to show that the riots may be resulting in lower
registration, and hence lower voting. This would result in lower registration
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ratio but not a lower turnout ratio.
Ideally, we would want to check if the impact is different for Hindus and
Muslims, but in the absence of individual-level data we can only conduct an
approximate check using the religious composition of the district. If the regis-
tration of Muslims decreases more than that of Hindus, then mechanically the
districts with a higher proportion of Muslims should have a larger reduction in
registration after riots. To check for this we run the regression separately for dis-
tricts that are above and below the median Muslim population share of 8.95%.
The results are shown in Table 8. We see that the magnitude of the impact is
higher in districts with above-median Muslim population share, with the effect
being almost absent in the districts with lower share of Muslims.
This provides some evidence to support a mechanism where following a riot,
Muslims’ registration in the following election is lower leading to an increased
vote share for the BJP. There could be many reasons for lower registrations.
There is evidence (Van Dyke, 1996) to show that voter lists are used by rioters
to identify victims by religion. Hence, Muslim households may not want to be
on these lists for the fear of being targeted. There is also displacement resulting
from riots which may lead to the names of the displaced being removed from
voter lists (Rashid, 2017). Using aggregate data it is not possible to distinguish
between these possibilities but it does open up the question for further research
using different methodologies.
It is to be noted that in India the electoral rolls are not prepared anew for each
election. The names on the rolls are carried forward and any additions or dele-
tions are made by enumerators before a new election. Presumably this process
is not always efficient as registration ratios of higher than 1 are frequently ob-
served in the data. Eligible voters may also apply to have their names included.
However, since elections are held every five years, a substantial population of
new voters becomes eligible each election and the effect may be largely driven
by their behaviour.
When we do similar regressions to look at difference in the effect of riots
on BJP’s vote share between the districts with Muslim population share above
and below the median, we find that the difference is not as large as with the
registration ratio. In the districts with low Muslim population share, where the
registration ratio is not at all affected be riots, we see that the point estimate of
the effect on BJP’s vote share is actually higher, although statistically insignifi-
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Table 8: Regressions showing the effect of riots on registration ratio and BJP
vote share in sub-samples with low and high Muslim population share
Dependent variable Registration ratioit BJP vote shareit
Muslim population share High Low High Low
1 2 3 4
IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 - 0.096∗∗∗ 0.002 0.049 0.081
(0.032) (0.023) (0.033) (0.059)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
KP F-stat 99 68 99 68
Number of districts 167 167 167 167
Number of observations 682 651 682 651
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
cant. Hence, the drop in registration may not be the only mechanism at play.
The other possible mechanism is that voters change the party that they vote
for in response to a riot happening in their district. This change could either be
permanent, leading to a change in the voter’s ideology or party affiliation, or it
could be just a temporary change. To check if riots lead to a permanent change
in voting behaviour, we examine the effect of riots at higher lags. We find that
the instrument is weak at higher lags as Hindu festivals falling on Fridays do
not lead to as much of an increase in riots as they do in the year just preceding
the election.10 Hence we show the reduced form and the structural estimates
at 1, 2 and 3 year lags in Figure 311. We stop at 3 years because the average
gap between elections is 4.4 years. As shown in Figure 2, both the structural
and reduced form estimates are not significantly different from zero at higher
lags, indicating that riots alter voting behaviour only for the election happening
in the immediate year after and not beyond that. This suggests that a change in
10If we take this as evidence that political parties or their supporters are using the festival co-
incidence to instigate riots in the year before elections, then this would suggest that the electoral
effect of riots does decay with time, which is why they are being orchestrated in the year before
elections.
11We include data on riots from years 1978 and 1979 to prevent any observation from being
excluded.
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ideology or party affiliation may not be driving our results.
Hence, to the extent that our results are driven by a change in the party pref-
erence of voters, it has to be a temporary change. As suggested by Brass (2003)
and many others, this could be because religious riots lead to the religious iden-
tity of voters becoming salient causing them to vote for political parties that
represent that identity. In this case, if we assume that a certain fraction of the
population of both communities votes according to religion, then the gain for
the party representing the majority community would be higher, explaining the
increased vote share of the BJP. There is a large literature in social science which
argues that the effect of communal riots on elections is through the salience of
religious identities (Brass, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004, 2009; Varshney, 2002; Jaf-
frelot, 2010). Many researchers refer to this phenomenon as ’communal polar-
isation’ or polarisation along religious lines. More precisely, it is the salience
of the religious identity of voters as a result of riots that leads voters to vote for
the party that best reflects that religious identity. Sen (2006) argues that people
have multiple identities which become salient at different times given the en-
vironment and context in which they live. In the case of India, some of these
identities are religion, caste, language and gender. But the evidence is not lim-
ited to India alone. Evidence from Israel suggests that political violence results
in increased religiosity among both Jews and Muslims (Zussman, 2014). While
religiosity and the salience of religious identity are not exactly the same con-
cept, it is quite likely that they are closely related. Brass (2003) in his extensive
study of riots in the city of Aligarh finds that riots lead to the salience of religion
as the primary identity, compared to caste. Jaffrelot (2010; pp 381-82) narrates
that in the spate of riots in Gujarat in 2002, even Adivasis, the indigenous people
thought to be outside the traditional Hindu caste system, joined with the upper
castes like the Patidars in assuming a Hindu identity and participating in the
riots. There is also evidence of political parties exacerbating and capitalising on
this salience of religious identity. As Wilkinson (2009) writes:
“In the Indian state of Gujarat, for instance, a rightwing Hindu
politician told an election meeting of Hindus, held in 2002 in the
aftermath of riots, that Muslims in the constituency had celebrated
with firecrackers and a procession when the news of the murder of
Hindu nationalist workers was known. The politician emphasized
to voters, ’This is not a Congress versus BJP election. It is Hindus
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Figure 2: Coefficients on different lags
Note: The left panel shows the coefficients on Festivalit−1, Festivalit−2 and Festivalit−3 in a
reduced form regression . The panel on the right shows the coefficients on Riotit−1, Riotit−2 and
Riot it−3 in a reduced form regression .
versus Muslims’ (Sharma 2004, 1 hour 15 min).”
5.4 Robustness checks
5.4.1 Fractional response
All the regressions shown above are linear, whereas the dependent variable
BJP voteshareit is a fraction and is thus bounded. To estimate the main re-
gression while allowing for the fractional dependent variable, we use the method
suggested by Papke and Wooldridge (2008). The explanatory variable is φ(dit−1),
which we name Riot ′it−1. This method involves controlling for district level fixed
effects by explicitly controlling for the time-means of the dependent variables.
The resulting regression is essentially a random effects regression which allows
for specifying the estimating equation as a logit or a probit function. The endo-
geneity correction using the instrumental variable is achieved using the control
function approach. The residuals from the first stage regression, also called the
control function, are used as additional regressors in the main regression. Papke
and Wooldridge suggest two methods for conducting fractional dependent vari-
able regressions controlling for fixed effects and allowing for endogeneity and
we conduct both types of regressions. The first is a Bernoulli quasi maximum
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Table 9: Regressions using the Papke-Wooldridge method
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
Pooled QMLE GEE
Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal
effect effect
Riot’it−1 0.245 ∗∗ 0.073 ∗∗ 0.124 0.037
(0.122) (0.036) (0.112) (0.034)
Other controls Lagged BJP rule Lagged BJP rule
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
Five year fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of districts 338 338
Number of observations 1345 1345
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
likelihood estimation and the second is a pooled panel generalised estimating
equation approach. In both cases we assume the link function to be probit. We
present the results and the estimated average marginal effects in Table 9. Note
that we do not use demographic and public goods controls as then the relevant
coefficient loses significance in the first stage. Also, we include five-year fixed
effects12 as time fixed effects are recommended in the Papke-Wooldridge pro-
cedure - dropping these does not change the results. The marginal effect for the
pooled QMLE case is very similar to the linear estimates, while the GEE coef-
ficient estimate is also of the same order but not statistically significant. This
demonstrates that a linear approximation may be correct in this case.
5.4.2 Alternative explanatory variable
Our main explanatory variable is an indicator of at least one riot having taken
place in the district in the calendar year before the year in which the election
occurred. But elections can take place in different months in a year. So, now
we construct the explanatory variable using riots occurring in a 12-month period
preceding the election. The results using this variable are shown in Table 10 and
12We divide the total period of 21 years into four periods of 5-6 years viz, 1981-1985, 1986-
1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2001 and we use these dummies as ’five-year fixed effects’. The logic is
that within each one of these four periods, we would have elections in all states, thus capturing
any country-wide fixed effects.
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Table 10: Regressions using riots in a 12-month period before the election as an
explanatory variable
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
1 2
FE IV FE
Riot’it−12months 0.063 ∗∗∗ 0.070 ∗∗
(0.010) (0.035)
Other controls Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
KP F-stat 114.5
Number of districts 338 334
Number of observations 1337 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
they are very similar to our original regressions.
5.4.3 Alternative instrument
In constructing the instrument Festival, we exploited the inter-state differences
in the importance of festivals to generate the variation required to obtain a strong
instrument. To investigate if our results are robust to changes in the methodol-
ogy used for constructing the instrument, we construct two alternative instru-
ments. Festival 1 disregards the interstate differences. We select five of the
most important Hindu festivals - Dushehra, Diwali, Ramanavami, Janmashtami
and Shivaratri and set the instrument as 1 (and 0 otherwise) for all states when-
ever one of these festivals falls on a Friday. Festival 2 includes only the festivals
that vary across states and excludes the two all-India festivals - Dushehra and
Diwali. The results are shown in Table 11. The coefficients are positive and
significant. The coefficient using Festival 2 is similar to the original regression
but the one using Festival 1 is considerably larger.
We also conduct a falsification test by constructing potential instruments us-
ing the other six days of the week and checking if they predicted a riot happening
in the same district-year. The results are shown in Table12. We find that while
some of the days did have statistically significant coefficients, the relationship
is particularly strong only for Friday with the F-statistic being nearly thrice as
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Table 11: Regressions using Festival 1 and Festival 2 as instruments
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
Festival 1 Festival 2
IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.142 ∗∗∗ 0.061 ∗
(0.022) (0.036)
Other controls Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
KP F-stat 227.1 174.6
Number of districts 334 334
Number of observations 1333 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
Table 12: Falsification test to check if instruments constructed using other days
of the week predict riots
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
Coefficient 0.007 0.044∗∗ 0.008 −0.020 −0.063∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.016)
F-stat 0.2 6.5 0.7 1 6.9 19.4 0
Note: Each column represents a regression with Riotit−1 as the dependent variable. The ex-
planatory variable for each column is an binary variable that takes a value 1 if at least one
Hindu festival fell on a particular day of the week. Other control variables, district fixed effects
and quadratic time trends are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at district
level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
large as the next highest day. This strengthens the validity of the instrument.
5.4.4 Riot intensity
In our preferred specification, we have only considered the extensive margin
because of measurement issues as mentioned in Section 3.2. Here we construct
two measures of riot intensity to check if we see similar results on the intensive
margin. The two measures are - Deaths - the total number reported riot-related
deaths, and Casualties - number of reported casualties, which includes deaths
and injuries. We apply the spatial correction as we do with the Riot variable and
constructed the variables Deaths? and Casualties? and run regressions with a
specification analoguous to the preferred one. The regression results are shown
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Table 13: Regressions using Deaths’ and Casualties’ as explanatory variables
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
IV FE IV FE
Deaths’it−1 0.007 ∗
(0.004)
Casualties’it−1 0.002 ∗
(0.001)
Other controls Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
KP F-stat 32.6 34.3
Number of districts 334 334
Number of observations 1333 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
in Table 13. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant at 10%
level. While we would not like to put too much emphasis on the point estimates
because of the obvious issues of reporting bias, the estimates do point in the
same direction as our main result.
5.4.5 Using seat share instead of vote share as the dependent variable
As political parties actually care about seats and not directly about votes, we use
the proportion of seats won by BJP in a given district as the dependent variable
instead of the percentage of votes. The results are shown in Table 14. In the first
and second columns the structural and IV regression results are presented. The
results are positive and significant but the coefficient of the IV regression seems
to be too large. This could be because of the linear specification as the seat share
variable has a large number of zeroes and a lot of observations are also close to
1. In columns 3 and 4 we present the marginal effects of non-linear regressions
using the Papke-Wooldridge method discussed earlier. We see that the results
are still positive and significant but are lower in magnitude.
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Table 14: Regressions using the percentage of seats in a district won by BJP as
the dependent variable
Dependent variable is BJP seat shareit
1 2 3 4
FE IV FE Pooled QMLE GEE
Riot’it−1 0.031 0.337 ∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.053) (0.048) (0.046)
Other controls Yes Yes Lagged BJP rule Lagged BJP rule
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five year fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Number of districts 334 339 338 338
Number of observations 1337 1333 1345 1345
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 are marginal effects obtained from the coefficient estimates.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
5.4.6 Dropping states and years
During the period covered in our study, two of the states that we include - Pun-
jab and Jammu & Kashmir - underwent a spate of violence between separatist
organisations and the state. These separatist movements had communal under-
tones and would have affected riots as well as electoral politics. These two
states are also different from the rest of our sample as they are not Hindu major-
ity states - Punjab has a majority population of Sikhs and Jammu & Kashmir has
a majority population of Muslims. Hence we drop these two states and conduct
the main regressions on a sample of 14 Hindu majority states. The results are
presented in the first two columns of Table 15. We find that the coefficients are
similar to those obtained from the full sample.
The demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 was a major event
in the history of independent India and the riots occurring in its aftermath in
1992 and in 1993 were widespread, and were covered widely in the national
media and in academic writing soon after (Gopal, 1993). To check that our re-
sults are not being driven mainly by this one major event, we drop the years
1993 and 1994 and run the regressions. The results are presented in columns
3 and 4. We find that the coefficients are still positive but they lose statistical
significance in the IV specifications. This may be because in non-Hindu major-
ity states, the riots may be having different effects compared to Hindu majority
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states. To check this we run the regressions without Jammu and Kashmir, and
Punjab (columns 5 and 6), and find that the coefficients are similar in magnitude
and significance to earlier regressions.
We also drop the years after the two years in which there were the maxi-
mum number of riots, 1986 and 1990. We find that the coefficient estimates are
positive and significant and slightly larger than the estimates for the full sample.
5.4.7 Lagged dependent variable
Another issue that may be important is the effect of the vote share of the BJP
in the last election. This may affect both riots and the vote share in the next
election. We argue that the effect of the previous election on riots would work
through the government and we do control for having a BJP government in the
state. We also find that even if we explicitly control for the BJP’s vote share
in the last election, the coefficient is not statistically significant, as shown in
Table 16. This regression is susceptible to Nickell bias, but as the coefficient on
lagged BJP vote share is not significant, and the variable is not included in our
preferred specification, we do not attempt to correct for it here.
5.4.8 Shorter intervals of time
Thus far we have conducted the analysis at the level of the year. We do have
data on the timing of the elections and the exact date of the riots, so it is possible
to conduct the analysis using a shorter time interval. We construct the dataset at
the monthly level. The month-wise distribution of elections, riots and the Festi-
val instrument in Figure 3 shows why the calendar year is the most appropriate
interval of time. We can see that elections are largely held in the months Febru-
ary, May and November with very few exceptions. The Festival instrument is
also concentrated in the 7 months during which those festivals fall. Since some
of these festivals are also region specific, a month-level analysis may implic-
itly give more weight to some regions over others. Doing the analysis at the
monthly level does not work for two other reasons. One is that the instrument
is very weak, but more importantly, it is possible that the timing of the election
may not be exogenous. The election cycle is five-yearly, but there is a window of
a few months around the time the five-year term of a legislative assembly ends,
when the election can be held. So, it is possible that riots may lead to a change
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Table 15: Regressions without observations from certain years, Jammu and
Kashmir, and Punjab
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
Dropping states Dropping years 1993
Punjab and J&K and 1994
1 2 3 4
FE IV FE FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.042 ∗∗∗ 0.083 ∗∗ 0.042 ∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.011) (0.036) (0.011) (0.030)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of districts 316 316 338 327
Number of observations 1284 1284 1171 1160
Dropping states Dropping years 1987
Punjab, J&K and and 1991
years 1993, 1994
5 6 7 8
FE IV FE FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.042 ∗∗∗ 0.053 ∗ 0.029 ∗∗ 0.094 ∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.031) (0.013) (0.032)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 19.37 18.71 18.78 19.41
Number of districts 316 309 338 333
Number of observations 1118 1111 1182 1177
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
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Table 16: Regressions with lagged vote share
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
1 2
FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.066 ∗∗∗ 0.077 ∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.028)
BJP vote share - 0.013 - 0.009
in last election (0.043) (0.045)
Other controls Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
KP F-stat 180.2
Number of districts 326 314
Number of observations 1203 1191
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
in the election dates. In any case, we conduct the analysis at the 3-month level to
counteract the weak instrument problem to some extent. We exclude the month
immediately preceding the election as we find that the Riot’ variable calculated
using the nearest riot in the three month period immediately preceding an elec-
tion, is correlated with a reduction in the BJP’s vote share. Here the endogeneity
of election timing may be at play. We look at four three-month periods viz, 2-4,
5-7, 8-10 and 11-13 months before the election. The results are presented in
Table 17. The coefficients are positive. Some of the coefficients are quite large
compared to the original coefficient. This could be because of weak instrument
bias as the regression where the instrument is strongest (5-7 months before the
election), the coefficient is very close to the one obtained in the main regression.
5.4.9 Previous election
We use the time period 1981-2001 because of availability of all data for this
period and also because the BJP was recognised and contesting elections ac-
tively in this period. The BJP was formed in April 1980 as a faction of the
erstwhile Janata party that lost the Lok Sabha elections earlier that year. In May
1980 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dismissed a number of state governments
and called premature elections. The BJP did contest in these elections but we
did not include them in our sample as they were contesting the elections barely
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Figure 3: Distribution of elections, the festival instrument and number of riots
over calendar months
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Table 17: Regressions conducted at different monthly levels
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
1 2 3 4
IV FE IV FE IV FE IV FE
Riot’i between two to four 0.287
months before the election (0.186)
Riot’i between five to seven 0.068 ∗∗
months before the election (0.030)
Riot’i between eight to ten 0.392 ∗∗∗
months before the election (0.107)
Riot’i between eleven to thirteen 0.427 ∗
months before the election (0.222)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
KP F-stat 2.9 257.5 23.9 7.3
Number of districts 334 334 334 334
Number of observations 1333 1333 1333 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
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Table 18: Regressions including state elections held in 1980
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
1 2 3
IV FE IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.060 0.232 ∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.068)
All riotsit−1 0.024 ∗∗∗
(0.006)
Riot’it−1 x Literacy rateit - 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes
KP F-stat 91.1 57.1 8.1
Number of districts 335 335 335
Number of observations 1563 1563 1563
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
a month after forming the party and the elections were being held in extraordi-
nary circumstances. In Table 18 we present some regressions using this larger
sample from 1980-2001. We construct the control variables for 1980 by extrap-
olating back from 1981 using the rate of change between 1981 and 1991. We
see that the coefficient estimate for our preferred specification is similar to that
for the original sample but is not statistically significant. However, the coef-
ficient estimates for two other specifications, one using All riots and the other
using an interaction with literacy are strongly significant and very similar to
those obtained using the original sample.
All the robustness checks presented above confirm that the results observed
in the main regressions are robust to different samples and specifications. We
conclude therefore that our results do represent the causal effect of religious
riots on the vote share of the BJP in India.
6 Conclusion
Religious riots have complex underpinnings - frequently social, economic and
political factors are involved. This paper demonstrates how these riots may in-
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fluence voter behaviour and the incentives of political parties. Using data on
Hindu-Muslims riots in India over 21 years, combined with electoral and demo-
graphic data, we demonstrate a causal link between communal riots and elec-
toral politics. We use a novel instrument that draws upon the random variation in
the day of the week that important Hindu festivals fall on each year to isolate the
causal effect of riots on electoral results. We find that riots occurring in the year
preceding an election increase the vote share of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party in the election. Our results are robust to various robustness checks
on the data and econometric analysis. This result does not imply that riots are
not caused by electoral reasons. It may be the case that most of the riots are
in fact the result of political calculations. Our attempt here is to disassociate
those political reasons for riots and to examine the effect on electoral results of
exogenously caused riots. The fact that our results show that a party systemati-
cally benefits from the riots, may establish that there is a clear incentive for this
party to cause riots for electoral benefit. Therefore, our findings have important
implications for the relationship between ethnic violence and electoral politics
not just in India, but also in other diverse democratic societies.
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Appendix
List of Hindu festivals by state used in the instrument Festival
Derivation of under-reporting bias
Let,
y be the dependent variable, the BJP vote share
x be the explanatory binary variable, Riot
z be the instrumental variable, Festival
Now, let x be the result of under-reporting of the variable x∗ resulting from
actual incidences of riots , with only a fraction p of the actual riots getting re-
ported.
Therefore, E[x|x∗ = 1] = p, 0 < p < 1, and E[x|x∗ = 0] = 0 (using the first
assumption)
Also, let the overall probability of at least one riot happening in a district
E[x∗] = λ , 0 < λ < 1.
This implies that if a riot is reported, then the probability of an actual riot is
1, i.e.
P[x∗ = 1|x = 1] = 1 (1)
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But if no riot is reported, then the probability of an actual riot is
P[x∗ = 1|x = 0] = P[x
∗ = 1] P[x = 0|x∗ = 1]
P[x = 0]
=
λ (1− p)
1− pλ (2)
Using the third assumption, we know that the reporting or non-reporting of
the riots is independent of our dependent variable.
∴ E[y|x,x∗] = E[y|x∗] (3)
Now, we want to look at how this biases our estimates.
The OLS estimate using only the reported riots would be,
βˆOLS = E[y|x = 1]−E[y|x = 0]
= E[y|x = 1,x∗ = 1]P[x∗ = 1|x = 1]+E[y|x = 1,x∗ = 0]P[x∗ = 0|x = 1]
−E[y|x = 0,x∗ = 1]P[x∗ = 1|x = 0]−E[y|x = 0,x∗ = 0]P[x∗ = 0|x = 0]
Rearranging and using (3)
βˆOLS = E[y|x∗ = 1](P[x∗ = 1|x = 1]−P[x∗ = 1|x = 0])
−E[y|x∗ = 0](P[x∗ = 0|x = 0]−P[x∗ = 0|x = 1])
Using (1) and (2)
βˆOLS = E[y|x∗ = 1](1− λ (1− p)1− pλ )
−E[y|x∗ = 0]( 1−λ
1− pλ −0)
=
1−λ
1− pλ (E[y|x
∗ = 1]−E[y|x∗ = 0])
=
1−λ
1− pλ βˆ
∗
OLS
Since,
1−λ
1− pλ < 1, the OLS estimate will be biased towards zero.
Now, let us look at the IV estimate. The second assumption tells us that
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reporting is independent of Festival.
∴ P[x = 1|z] = pP[x∗ = 1|z] (4)
The IV estimate calculated using the reported riots x is given by
βˆIV =
E[y|z = 1]−E[y|z = 0]
E[x|z = 1]−E[x|z = 0] =
1
p
E[y|z = 1]−E[y|z = 0]
E[x∗|z = 1]−E[x∗|z = 0] =
1
p
βˆ ∗IV
Since 0 < p < 1, the magnitude of the IV estimate will be biased upwards.
we have shown the proofs here using simple regressions but the principles apply
to regressions with other covariates.
Now let us look at the probable magnitudes of the bias in our case. We know
that the observed probability of riots as we see in the data of pλ = 0.07 and the
rate of reporting is approximately p = 0.77. Hence, the actual probability of at
least one riot happening in a district in a year λ = 0.091
The OLS is biased by 1-
1−λ
1− pλ = 1−
0.91
0.93
' 2.2%
The IV is biased by 1/p−1 = 1/0.77−1' 30%
Hence, the bias in the IV estimate is very large, and this may explain the
estimates that we obtain. This is because the effect of the reporting rate p on
the OLS estimate is moderated by the overall probability λ , whereas the IV
estimate is directly impacted by p. The lower the reporting rate the higher the
bias in both cases, but the magnitude of the bias in bounded above by λ in the
OLS case, whereas in the case of IV, it is unbounded.
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Results from specification I
Table A1: Structural and IV regressions using Riotit−1 as the dependent variable
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
FE FE IV FE IV FE
Riotit−1 0.035 ∗∗∗ 0.032 ∗∗∗ 0.402 ∗∗∗ 0.234 ∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.150) (0.128)
Other controls No Yes No Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Kleibergen-Paap F stat 19.37 19.41
Number of districts 338 338 334 334
Number of observations 1345 1337 1341 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
The number of observations in the even columns are lower than in the odd columns because of
missing Census data in the control variables. In the last two columns, four districts with only
one observation, i.e. where BJP contested an election only once, are dropped.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
Results for the Indian National Congress
In all our regressions we have only examined until now the effect of riots on
the vote share of the BJP. We can also investigate their effect on the other major
national party, the Indian National Congress. Since these two parties compete
against each other in most elections, we expect to see a negative effect on the
vote share of the Congress and that is what we observe as shown in Table A2.
This is consistent with other studies from political science which have also sug-
gested that the Congress’s vote share in state assembly elections was affected
adversely by the outbreak of an additional riot (Nellis et al., 2015).
Interactions between riots and demographic variables
We check for the interaction of the Riot ′it−1 variable with demographic variables.
The results are shown in Table A3. In columns 1, 2 and 3, we include as ex-
planatory variables the interactions of Riot ′it−1 with the percentage of Muslims,
the literacy rate and the rate of urbanisation respectively. The interaction of a
demographic variable with Riot ′it−1 is instrumented with the interaction of the
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Table A2: Regressions for the Indian National Congress
Dependent variable is INC vote shareit
1 2
FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.018 ∗ - 0.110∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.030)
INC governmentit−1 - 0.018∗∗∗ - 0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Other controls Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
KP F-stat 169.7
Number of districts 338 338
Number of observations 1401 1401
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
same variable with Festivalit−1. The regression results show that an increasing
literacy rate is correlated with a reduced impact of riots on elections. We cannot
interpret the coefficients on these interactions causally as these demographic
variables may be correlated with other omitted district level variables which
may be driving the effect. For instance, the strongly negative coefficient on the
interaction with literacy could be driven by the impact of riots on elections be-
ing lower in southern India, which has higher literacy levels, but northern and
southern India differ on many parameters other than literacy. The results are
similar if we use interaction with a dummy variable that is 1 when the average
value of a demographic characteristic is greater than the median.
Close elections
We run our main specification on two sub-samples. Sub-sample 1 consists of
all districts where in at least one electoral constituency the BJP won or lost by
a margin of at most 3%. Sub-sample 2 is similar with a smaller margin of 2%.
The idea is to investigate if the effect is very different when the election turns
out to be close. The results are presented in Table A4 . The coefficients are not
statistically significant, probably because of the small number of observations.
We find that for Sub-sample 1 the point estimate is very similar to our original
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Table A3: Regressions of interactions with demographic characteristics
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
Interaction term is interaction of Riotit−1 with
Percent Percent Percent
Muslims Literates Urban
1 2 3
IV FE IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.062 ∗ 0.267 ∗∗∗ 0.034 ∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.069) (0.064)
Interaction term 0.0003 - 0.005 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗
(0.0014) (0.001) (0.003)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes Yes
KP F-stat 69.6 24.1 1.8
No. of districts 334 334 334
No. of observations 1333 1333 1333
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
regression, while for Sub-sample 2 it is a little smaller.
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Table A4: Regressions using close election sub-samples
Dependent variable is BJP vote shareit
1 2
IV FE IV FE
Riot’it−1 0.064 0.044
(0.044) (0.048)
Other controls Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes
Quadratic time trend Yes Yes
KP F-stat 38.8 39.4
Number of districts 151 120
Number of observations 399 296
Standard errors are clustered at district level and are shown in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** - 1%. ** - 5%, * - 10%.
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